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Abstract 
User input validation is a technique to counter at-
tacks on web applications. In typical client-server 
architectures, this validation is performed on the client 
side. This is inefficient because hackers bypass these 
checks and directly send malicious data to the server. 
User input validation thus has to be duplicated from 
the client-side (HTML pages) to the server-side (PHP 
or JSP etc.). 
We present a black-box approach for shielding and 
testing web application against bypass attacks. We 
automatically analyze HTML pages in order to extract 
all the constraints on user inputs in addition to the 
JavaScript validation code. Then, we leverage these 
constraints for an automated synthesis of a shield, a 
reverse-proxy tool that protects the server side. The 
originality and main contribution of this paper is to 
offer a solution specifically tailored to the web appli-
cation, through a preliminary learning/analysis step. 
An experimental study on several open-source web-
applications evaluates the effectiveness of the protec-
tion tool and the different flaws detected by the testing 
too and the impact of the shield on performance. 
1. Introduction 
One important property shared by most web appli-
cations is the client-server architecture, which roughly 
divides the application code in two parts. The main 
part executes on the server, while the client part in-
cludes a browser in charge of the interpretation of the 
HTML and JavaScript code (other components exist 
like flash, java applets, ActiveX etc.). 
In this architecture, the input validation of web applica-
tion is performed both by the client and server sides. In 
practice, many validation treatments are under the 
responsibility of the client. Decentralizing the execu-
tion of input validation allows alleviating the load of 
inputs to be checked by the server-side. Incorrect user 
inputs are detected by the client-side code (HTML and 
JavaScript code) and not sent to the server.  
This architecture implicitly assumes that the client 
is expected to check the validity of its inputs before 
calling the server, while the server is responsible for its 
outputs. This is a perfect example of design-by-
contract [1] that relies on the assumption that both 
parts are trustable. However, the assumption that the 
client is trustable is dangerous, as recalled by J. Of-
futt:[2] “Validating input data on the client is like ask-
ing your opponent to hold your shield in a sword 
fight”. It is not possible to trust the execution of the 
validation on the client side. For this reason, it is high-
ly recommended to duplicate the validation process 
and perform it at the server side. In addition, input 
validation is a serious security issue. The SANS TOP 
25 [3] reports that one of the main vectors of attacks is 
input validation. Relying on the client will weaken the 
input validation. In fact, a malicious user is able to 
modify the JavaScript code using some plugins (like 
Firebug or DragonFly). These tools enable the poten-
tial attacker to bypass the client-side by modifying the 
HTML and JavaScript code and thus disabling the 
client-side input validation. Therefore, hackers can 
bypass the client-side input validation and send mali-
cious requests to the server-side directly. Furthermore, 
the server cannot detect that client-side input valida-
tions have been disabled or hacked. An analysis of 
bypass-based attacks has been initially proposed by 
Offutt et al. [2, 4], demonstrating that the n-tiers archi-
tectures may lead to security vulnerabilities, or at least 
to robustness problems for the server side. 
As a basic counter-measure, it is recommended to 
carefully filter and check user inputs. In this paper, we 
propose an automated “black-box” process, which 
either allows: 
 - Auditing the server-side in order to locate the 
weaknesses/vulnerabilities (in that case the server-
side application code needs to be manually 
adapted) through systematic bypass testing [2]; 
- or shielding it by building a reverse proxy security 
component, called Bypass-Shield that captures the 
client-side validation constraints, extends them, and 
enforces them. The shield implements the contracts 
between client/server as an independent component, 
making a design-by-contract applicable in the context 
of web application security and robustness. 
The common mechanism we use for both analyses 
is a semi-automated extraction of client-side validation 
constraints (HTML and JavaScript). 
On one hand, shielding the application involves 
building an “in-the-middle” component, which is the 
trustable intermediate that guarantees that contracts are 
fulfilled by the client (because located on the server-
side). 
On the other hand, bypass testing involves syste-
matically violating these constraints. Then, requests are 
built to include some erroneous or malicious data. 
Finally they are sent to the server and may lead to 
finding robustness and security problems. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 presents the background concepts and shows 
the context of this work. In addition, it describes the 
scope of this work and presents the limitations and the 
main differences between our approach and existing 
approaches. Section 3 explains the overall approach 
and describes the process. While, Section 4, 5 and 6 
detail each of the three processes included in the ap-
proach, respectively, the client-side analysis for col-
lecting the constraints, the Bypass-Shield and the au-
tomated bypass-testing. Then, Section 7 presents the 
empirical results. Finally, Section 8 concludes and 
discusses future work. 
2. Context 
This section introduces the main concepts used in 
this paper. It presents the input validation architecture 
used in web applications and the client-side validation 
techniques. Afterwards, it details the related work 
discussing the existing approaches along with their 
advantages and limitations in both academia and secu-
rity industry. 
2.1. Definitions 
Client-side: it includes the part of the web applica-
tion that is executed by the client browser (Firefox, 
Internet Explorer etc.). The client-side contains the 
HTML code, the cookies, the Java applets, and the 
flash programs etc. that are executed by the client ma-
chine.  
Server-side: The server side contains the core ap-
plication code (which is often called business code), 
the web server which is the framework in which the 
business code runs. Several technologies of web serv-
ers exist (Apache, IIS etc.). The server-side may con-
tain a database. 
Input parameter: Web applications may have sev-
eral input parameters, which are assigned and sent to 
the server using URLs or forms. For the forms, an 
input parameter is located in the HTML code. It is a set 
of tags defining fields to be filled by end users. Then, 
this data is usually sent to the server-side for 
processing. The server responds according to the form 
data and the requested service (store, search, register, 
delete etc.). For the URLs, input data are hardcoded in 
the URL and sent back to the server (using JavaScript 
for example). In this paper, we apply the approach on 
forms. There are many input vectors for web applica-
tion that will be taken into account by the shield in 
future versions. 
Pre- and post-condition: The constraint a parame-
ter must satisfy. The client is expected to check the 
validity of the input before calling the server, while the 
server is responsible for its outputs. 
Input Validation: The process of validating user 
inputs. It can be performed in the client-side and in the 
server-side.  
Black-box: In this paper, we consider a “black-
box” technique any technique that does not require the 
access to internal information (for instance the applica-
tion code). Extracting the information (URLs, forms, 
cookies) that clients can get from the server is thus a 
black-box technique. This is typically the information a 
hacker exploits to perform attacks. 
Bypass Testing: It is a black-box testing technique 
which involves bypassing client-side input validation 
and triggering the server-side input validation (if it 
exists) [2]. Bypassing is possible either via some 
browser plugins (like Firebug or Opera Dragonfly) or 
by automatically generating requests to be sent directly 
to the server (using Java or C++ for example).   
Client-side pre-conditions: They are pre-
conditions that are checked by the client. They are 
expressed by HTML code (like MaxLength) or Java-
Script functions. These constraints are part of the 
client-side input-validation process. They enforce limi-
tations and tailored conditions on the user inputs. 
Robustness bypass testing: Aiming at challenging 
the robustness of the web application server-side by 
directly providing erroneous inputs. These inputs vi-
olating the client-side constraints are sent to the server-
side. The final goal is to uncover robustness problems 
and improve the server-side code. 
Security bypass testing: Targets the evaluation of 
server-side security. The data sent in this case 
represents typical attack vectors (code injection attacks 
like XSS: cross-site-scripting or SQL Injection). Some 
predefined attack patterns are injected and sent to the 
server, which is expected to filter, sanitize or block 
these malicious data. The final objective is to highlight 
security issues. 
2.2. Client-side validation techniques:  
The traditional client-server architecture defines a 
distributed model which involves two different places 
where the application code executes.  
Erroneous data is detected at an early stage, at 
client-side and is not sent to the server. Therefore, the 
code executes on the client machine and the server 
does not intervene.  
Client-side input validation is implemented through 
two different kinds of code: 
• Hardcoded HTML code. 
• JavaScript code. 
Hardcoded HTML code allows defining a set of 
predefined constraints. These constraints are imple-
mented by expressing the corresponding tag property. 
For instance, the max length constraint has to be ex-
pressed within the input tag (like maxlength=20). 
Other constraints are expressed by choosing one par-
ticular tag. By construction, it constrains the kind of 
user inputs. Check boxes can only be checked or un-
checked. In radio button group, only one can be 
checked. 
JavaScript code makes it possible to express more 
advanced and specific constraints. Using JavaScript 
code which includes conditions, loops and regular 
expressions (among other code facilities) it is possible 
to express any constraints on the user inputs. This 
JavaScript code can be executed before submitting the 
form to the server-side. Erroneous inputs are rejected 
by the JavaScript code and not sent to the server. Then 
a message is displayed to the end user to indicate the 
erroneous inputs that should be corrected.  
To give the intuition of a typical JavaScript con-
straint, we present the following JavaScript code that 
allows checking emails. 
function checkEmail(myForm) { 
if (/^\w+([\.-]?\w+)*@\w+([\.-
]?\w+)*(\.\w{2,3})+$/.test(myForm.emailAddr
.value)) {return true;} 
alert("Invalid Email"); return false; } 
2.3. Scope of the contribution and related 
work 
This paper describes a proxy-firewall for web ap-
plications, called bypass-Shield. It checks and blocks 
invalid user inputs on the server-side. The rules to be 
checked are automatically inferred from a learning 
phase (involving parsing the web pages) during which 
HTML and JavaScript codes are retrieved. The rules 
can then be manually tuned to offer a tighter control. 
The learning phase also produces a complete test suite 
with invalid inputs. These tests can be used to evaluate 
either the efficiency of the proxy-firewall or the beha-
vior of a web application when invalid inputs are sent. 
It is important to note that we do not aim at protect-
ing Ajax-based web apps. There other techniques 
which target specifically Ajax based web apps (for 
instance [5]).  
The idea of proxy-firewall for web applications is 
well known and a variety of commercial and free tools 
already exists. The originality and main contribution of 
this paper is to offer a solution that is specialized for 
each application through a preliminary learning phase. 
Existing web security techniques help: 
1. Auditing/testing vulnerabilities from a black-box 
perspective (like IBM AppScan [6], HP WebIns-
pect [7], W3AF [8] etc.).  
2. Auditing vulnerabilities from a white-box perspec-
tive using static analysis of the application code. 
3. Protecting/shielding the client side for the server 
(like BrowserShield [9] etc.). 
4. Protect/shield the server side (like ModSecurity 
[10]) using signature-based techniques. 
In this paper, none of these approaches is used to 
shield the application and test it. The techniques in 
point 2 and 3 are outside the scope of this paper.  
White-box auditing aims at cleaning the internal code 
from potential vulnerabilities before deploying or in-
stalling the software. The application code is statically 
analyzed to detect malware or security breaches. Shiel-
ding the client-side is a different task. Several protect-
ing tools can be used to protect clients from security 
threats. (NoScript for protecting against XSS attacks 
[11] or web security suites like Norton Internet Securi-
ty or McAfee etc.).  
Black-box audit/testing tools, like the open-source 
tool W3af  [8] are mostly generic tools based on 
known library of attack patterns that are sent to the 
server. Most of these tools are specific to one attack 
pattern and are optimized for one specific web tech-
nology. These automated tools cannot replace security 
experts who can execute more sophisticated attacks 
based on their knowledge of the web applications. In 
this paper, we do not focus on generating test cases 
based on already known patterns but on extracting and 
violating the specific pre-conditions of the web appli-
cation inputs. Our approach is thus different from these 
generic tools and tries to assist the task of the security 
expert who tailors his analysis for a specific web appli-
cation. 
The solution for shielding the server side (point 4) 
are signature-based in the sense they monitor the inputs 
that are sent to the server and check if they conform to 
a specific attack signature (a widely used tool is Mod-
Security [10]).  The suspected input is sanitized or the 
request is simply rejected. There are two main draw-
backs for these tools. First, they can easily be bypassed 
using new patterns, for instance by encoding the input 
to be undetected. 
The second main limitation of these tools is that 
they are not specific to the application. This makes it 
difficult for these tools to detect attacks that violate the 
pre-conditions specific to the application, which may 
lead to the crash of the database (even a max length 
constraint violation is undetected).  
This paper focuses on the second limitation, pro-
posing a test case generation targeting the specific pre-
conditions of a given web application. A list of all 
these testing and protection tools is maintained by the 
OWASP community (see [12]). 
There are two approaches which are close to our 
approach [13, 14] and which focus more generally on 
testing the input validation mechanisms [13] and on 
bypassing client side validation to discover parameter 
tampering attacks [14] using a similar approach. How-
ever, our technique provides the same testing capabili-
ties and extends it to enable an automated shielding of 
the web apps against bypass attacks.  
Bypassing client-side validation is a well-known 
security issue and penetration testing has been using 
client side validation bypass to validate web applica-
tions. Offutt et al. formalized the concept of bypass 
testing [2] and defined its main characteristics. The 
CyberChair web application (a popular submission and 
reviewing system used for conferences) served as a 
feasibility case study to provide initial insights on the 
efficiency of bypass testing strategy. They tested it 
using bypass testing strategy and they succeeded to 
discover serious bugs. For instance, they were able to 
submit papers without authentication by exploiting 
bypass testing. 
They also proposed an automated tool for bypass 
testing. They used it to test a simple case study STIS 
(Small Textual Information System, a web application 
they built). In their approach, they proposed three dif-
ferent strategies for generating test data. All these 
strategies target testing the robustness of the web ap-
plication by sending invalid inputs, set of inputs or by 
violating the control flow (by breaking expected execu-
tion scenarios).   
This paper extends and puts more automation in the 
process of bypass testing to include semi-automated 
crawling and testing of the security of the web applica-
tion, distinguishing between security and robustness 
bypass testing. Testing security involves different test 
data and a different oracle function than robustness 
testing. More importantly, the novelty of the proposed 
approach lies in the Shielding part. The bypass-Shield 
is constructed using the same artifacts that are used to 
generate the inputs violating the constraints. By con-
struction, it allows the protection of the web applica-
tion against these very invalid inputs used to test the 
servers. 
Offutt et al. applied their approach to an industrial 
case study [15], a web application developed by Avaya 
Research Labs. They were able to discover 63 failure 
using 184 test cases. However their approach was not 
automated and the discovered failures are minor and no 
security flaw was discovered simply because the by-
pass tests did not take into account attack patterns. 
3. Overview of the approach 
From the same initial treatment, the parsing of the 
web page, the process we propose allows the derivation 
of a reverse-proxy (Bypass-Shield) and the creation of 
robustness and security test cases to validate the shield. 
Figure 1 shows an overview of this process. Two tools 
have been developed, the Bypass Shield and the By-
pass-AutoTest, into the framework of the French ANR 
DALI project (focusing on application-level intrusion 
detection). 
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Figure 1 -  Pre-condition based Testing and shielding 
of web applications 
The pre-conditions are Boolean expressions that 
evaluate to true if the value is correct and false when it 
is not (the input value is violating the pre-
condition).The overall process involves three main 
steps. 
The First step involves parsing systematically all 
pages in order to collect forms along with their respec-
tive inputs and pre-conditions. Then these client-side 
constraints are stored in a file. The result of this step is 
used in the next two steps. The difficult points and 
originality of this first step are: 
- To exhaustively analyze a website in depth.  This 
means taking into account the login process to 
access all website pages. In addition to an auto-
mated crawler, manual navigation is needed to 
completely parse the website.  
- To deal with JavaScript code used for validating 
user inputs.  
The second step aims at shielding the web applica-
tion using the initial set of constraints collected at step 
1. It results in a reverse-proxy, called Bypass-Shield, 
which intercepts and checks the inputs from the client 
as well as server responses. The collected pre-
conditions are completed with automated and manual 
pre-conditions. The automated pre-conditions are 
based on a dictionary listing a set of constraints to be 
applied to specific inputs (for instance emails have a 
specific format). The shield contract manager uses the 
name of the input to find any available predefined 
constraint. This task leaves out untreated inputs. The 
manual addition of constraints completes the auto-
mated process by providing a user-friendly tool to add 
new pre-conditions. The obtained pre-conditions are 
included in the Bypass-Shield which will intercept user 
requests and check the validity of user submitted inputs 
(the tool is available upon request). 
The third step involves a test generation process, 
based on the information collected at step 1. The pre-
conditions are used to generate test data for bypass 
testing. The idea of bypass testing is to generate data 
which systematically violate the client-side constraints. 
As a result, we obtain a test tool, Bypass-AutoTest, 
which allows auditing how the server reacts when 
receiving every kind of invalid data. Bypass-AutoTest 
has been implemented first to check that the Shield 
works as expected and prevents attacks issued by the 
client-side. 
Step2 (Shielding) and step 3 (Auditing through test-
ing) can be used independently or altogether. In the 
first case, the shield allows protecting the server with-
out modifying the server’s code. The advantage is that 
the security controls are centralized in an independent 
component, which is responsible for the contracts be-
tween client and server. In the other case, the audit 
allows identifying the server robustness weaknesses 
and security flaws. 
We distinguish between these two kinds of issues. 
From a pure testing point of view, the oracle, the gen-
eral interpretation of the results and the impact differ. 
This means that the intent and the oracle are not the 
same.  
The robustness oracle analyzes the server responses 
to find error messages (like java stack trace) or unex-
pected behavior (returning the same page without 
showing warnings), while the security oracle seeks to 
find any information or behavior that will harm the 
security of the application. For instance, the security 
oracle checks that the server responses does not reveal 
any critical information that can be used by hackers, or 
that the server does not behaves in an insecure way. 
4. Client-side analysis for pre-conditions 
identification 
This work focuses on bypass-attacks exploiting 
forms, and does not handle attacks exploiting other 
attack vectors (like the cookies or HTTP headers). The 
goal of the HTML analysis is to collect all the user 
inputs from client-side web pages. User inputs are 
mainly forms which are filled by the end users. This 
task is fulfilled using three complementary techniques: 
- Automated crawling of the application pages 
- Manual navigation in the website to explore all 
possible scenarios 
- Automated navigation using functional test built 
using testing framework like (HttpUnit [16] or Se-
lenium [17]).   
In fact, automated crawling of the web is usually in-
complete, and does not reach all the application html 
pages. Modern web applications use partial page re-
fresh, asynchronous requests and have often just one 
URL throughout. Visiting all the links will not allow 
reaching all the HTML pages. In addition, the behavior 
depends on the client. For these reasons, we complete 
the automated crawling by two strategies, the manual 
surfing and the execution of functional tests.   
In this section, we show how the automated crawler 
works and how the bypass shield is used to collect the 
HTML and finally how we deal with the JavaScript 
constraints. 
4.1. The automated crawler 
The crawler allows exploring all the available web 
pages by visiting all the links. The parser can be confi-
gured to use a login and password. This allows going 
beyond the login web page and exploring the entire 
web application pages. Furthermore, the parser can be 
configured to avoid visiting some links that will dis-
connect the user from the web application. This feature 
is implemented in a generic way using regular expres-
sion to create the set of links to be ignored. For exam-
ple, all the logout or disconnect links should be 
avoided. In addition, the parser only visits the pages 
that are in the base URL. This leads to avoid leaving 
the web application and parsing other websites/web 
pages. The crawler runs until all the accessible web 
pages are parsed. This crawler allows collecting and 
storing all the forms along with the associated con-
straints.  
 
4.2. Manual navigation and Use of functional 
tests 
During this step, testers are asked to run functional 
tests or navigate manually throughout the web applica-
tion and to explore all the possible scenarios. During 
this step the bypass-shield is set in monitoring mode: it 
collects and analyzes the code to be sent to the client. 
As shown in Figure 2, the shield intercepts the web 
pages that are sent to the client and analyzes them in 
order to collect the forms. 
 
Figure 2 - Collecting pre-conditions using manual na-
vigation and functional tests 
The forms and pre-conditions that are collected are 
stored with the other ones already identified using the 
crawler. The process of extracting the HTML is com-
mon to the crawler and the manual step. Next, we show 
how the HTML code is analyzed and how the pre-
conditions are extracted. 
4.3. Collecting HTML constraints 
To collect the list of user inputs along with their 
constraints from the HTML code all web pages should 
be parsed and analyzed. Each web page is analyzed to 
locate all the forms. These forms are parsed to collect 
their inputs. The input may contain some predefined 
HTML constraints. For instance, we may have max 
length attribute that defines a pre-condition on the 
length of an age input.   
Table 1 - HTML predefined constraints 
Constraint name Description 
FormMethod Method is either GET or POST and 
should not be modified. 
Disabled The input is disabled and not sent. 
MaxLength Maximum input size. 
MultipleValue The value should be one of the values 
set. 
ReadOnly The input is read only and cannot be 
modified. 
RequiredValue The input value is required and cannot 
be empty 
SingleValue The input has a single value, Null or 
that single value  
 
At this stage, only HTML constraints are treated. A 
separate and parallel process allows dealing with Java-
Script code. It will be presented in the next section. 
Once all the forms and their inputs are collected, 
the tool creates a set of objects for each Form and its 
inputs. We have modeled the types of inputs and the 
constraints as classes. This approach allows querying 
forms and inputs and facilitates the test data genera-
tion, the construction of the test suite and the configu-
ration of the bypass-shield. Each input is categorized 
based on its type. Table 1 shows these predefined con-
straints. For instance, the text input corresponds to 
InputText object. Each constraint is extracted from the 
inputs and stored according to its type.   
4.4. Interpreting JavaScript  
As we have mentioned previously, the JavaScript is 
not directly parsed. The difficulty of dealing with Ja-
vaScript code is due to its grammar which is complex, 
and this makes the semantic analysis very hard to au-
tomate. The solution that we propose involves running 
the client-side JavaScript validation code itself inside 
the shied. Instead of inferring the semantic of the Java-
Script constraints, we actually run the JavaScript code 
inside the shield automatically when a form is submit-
ted. We lift the JavaScript code from the client, and 
then rerun it automatically in the shield.    
The main steps of this process involve: 
- Locating the JavaScript code implementing con-
straints on user inputs: the JavaScript validation 
code is usually triggered just before submitting the 
form (using for instance the onsubmit attribute) or 
attached to specific text input events (like onblur 
when the user finishes typing and leaves a text in-
put). 
- Extracting and storing this code: We should keep a 
mapping between the JavaScript code and the re-
lated form or input.     
This process runs in parallel with the extraction of 
HTML static constraints. We extract for a given web 
page the JavaScript code related to the input validation. 
Then we keep a mapping between the JavaScript code 
and the related form or input.  
5. Server-side shield: a shield tool for 
protecting against bypass attacks 
This section presents the bypass-shield and its 
components. First, we introduce the contract manager 
tool that allows the addition of constraints to the set 
that has been generated in previous step. Then, the 
bypass-shield is presented in details. 
5.1. The contracts manager  
 
 
Table 2 – Examples of constraints 
Constraint name Description 
Interval The value should be within the defined 
interval  
MinLength Minimum input size  
RegEx The value conforms to the given 
regular expression 
Date The value has a date format 
NumberFormat The value is numeric 
ListOfValues This value is among a list of values 
Required The input has to be filled 
Range The value is within an interval 
 
The contracts manager allows adding new con-
straints in order to complete the set of constraints ex-
tracted from the client’s HTML code. Security engi-
neers can add constraints manually through this man-
ager and it also adds new constraints automatically. 
Table 2  presents some examples of constraints pro-
vided by the manager. 
The contracts manager automatically injects con-
straints using a dictionary file, in which the user de-
fines a set of RegEx constraints. These constraints are 
automatically mapped to input according to their tag 
names. For instance a tag with the name email will take 
the following RegEx constraint:  
 
^([a-zA-Z0-9_]|\\-|\\.)@(([a-zA-Z0-9_] 
|\\-)+\\.)[a-zA-Z]{2,4}$ 
This constraint forces the email addresses to satisfy 
a specific format. The manager automatically adds this 
constraint for each email tag, even if the email format 
was not enforced in the HTML code. This verification 
is usually added using the JavaScript code. On the 
basis of the dictionary, the manager can thus partly 
compensate the fact that we don’t analyze JavaScript 
code. Once the configuration file that is used by the 
bypass-shield (it is a binary file storing the constraints) 
is filled with constraints it is fed to bypass-shield 
which is in charge of protecting the side-side part from 
bypass-attacks. 
5.2. The bypass-shield 
As shown in Figure 3, the bypass-shield aims at 
protecting and serves as a barrier against the attacks. It 
is installed as a reverse proxy on the server side of the 
web application. Therefore, all the requests are inter-
cepted by the bypass-shield and checked.  
For each request, the bypass-shield performs the 
following steps: 
1. Intercept the request 
2. Extract the user inputs and locate the correspond-
ing form that was filled out by the user. 
3. Check and validate the input according to the 
related constraints and run the related JavaScript 
validation code.  
4. Accept the request and send it to the server side 
application or reject and send an error message to 
the client. 
Only requests containing user inputs are checked. 
The URL requests are passed to the server. The server 
is expected to respond by sending back the webpage 
(the code) of that URL. The user inputs are extracted 
from the selected requests. In order to locate the cor-
responding form, the algorithm tries to find among the 
stored forms (they are stored in a binary file) the one 
having the same inputs (same number and same name) 
and the same action URL (the URL to which the inputs 
are sent). The HTTP request contains all the names of 
inputs along with their values. The following example 
illustrates how the algorithm extracts the input names 
from the request (in this example they are the name, 
the phone and the zip code). The action URL is simply 
the request URL without the inputs part.  
The request: 
http://www.mysite.com/account.php?name=Tim&phon
e=0234234354&zipcode=75000   
The extracted inputs: name, phone and zip code 
The action URL:  
http://www.mysite.com/account.php 
Once the form corresponding to the request is lo-
cated, the bypass-shield performs the validation of the 
inputs using the related constraints. All the constraints 
should be respected. If the inputs do not satisfy the 
constraints, the request is not forwarded to the server 
and an error message explaining the problem is sent to 
the user. In addition, the JavaScript code that is related 
to the form or one of its inputs is executed on these 
inputs (using a JavaScript execution engine). The result 
is a Boolean value (true or false) that means: accept or 
reject the input data. When all constraints are satisfied 
and JavaScript validation succeeds, the request is for-
warded to the server. 
 
Figure 3 - Overview of the shield 
5.3. Impact of enforcing constraints on       
security 
By validating client-side constraints, the shield pre-
vents some code-injection based attacks like SQL in-
jection on numeric fields, by enforcing constraints on 
numeric fields so it becomes impossible to bypass this 
constraint and perform any code-injection attack. In 
addition, it makes it harder for attackers to do long 
SQL injections when the field length is limited. 
By ensuring that the provided parameters are strict-
ly those required, the shields limit IDS evasion tech-
niques like HTTP parameter pollution [18], which is a 
new kind of attack that involves exploiting parameters 
in the URL (by duplicating them and injecting attacks).  
This kind of enforcement reduces the attack surface 
of the shielded web application. Using of the shield in 
front of WebGoat [19] (which is a vulnerable OWASP 
web application used for teaching security) is a good 
example to show how the bypass-shield provides extra 
security, and where it does not. As shown in WebGoat, 
the developers focus very often the fields that are under 
user’s control (like text fields), and neglect performing 
input validation on other fields, like check boxes or 
select lists, which have predefined values. Enforcing 
constraints on these fields is relatively simple since the 
expected values are known. By these simple con-
straints, the shield ensures that the application behaves 
as expected by the developer and protects against some 
attacks. 
6. Automated bypass testing 
This section details the automated generation of 
bypass testing. The client-side analysis provides useful 
information on constraints which can be used directly 
to generate data violating these constraints. On one 
hand, this data can be used within our bypass-testing 
too or other security tools like fuzzing tools in order to 
audit the web application. On the other hand, they 
could be used for evaluating the bypass-shield.   
The data generation process involves three major 
steps. We start with the automatic generation of mali-
cious test data that violate the client-side constraints. 
Then, we build complete requests that include the 
malicious data and for which all other tags contain 
valid data. These requests are sent to the server-side. 
The last step involves the analysis of the server res-
ponses and the automated classification of the results, 
in order to facilitate their interpretation by the testers. 
6.1. The generation of malicious test data   
The initial step involves generating test data that 
bypass the client-side constraints. For each constraint, 
we have created a data generator in our Bypass-
AutoTest tool.  This data generator is in charge of 
creating the data violating a specific constraint. The 
following example illustrates the approach.  
For example, when the input is a phone number 
with a maximum length limit (10 characters), the data 
generator takes this input and its constraint and gene-
rates a random string with a length exceeding the re-
quired max length by 10. The interval of violation can 
be defined by the user (10 is the default value).  
Table 3 shows some examples of constraints and 
the generated data.  
Table 3 - The way constraints are violated 
Constraint Violation 
FormMethod Use another form method 
Disabled Make it enabled and generate a random 
string 
MaxLength Generate data exceeding MaxLength 
MultipleValue Generate a different random value 
RegEx Create a value not conform to RegEx 
Date Create a random value that is not a date 
NumberFormat Generate a string with alphabetic characters  
ListOfValues Generate a value not in the list of values 
Range Generate a value outside that range 
6.2. Construction and execution of bypass tests 
This step requires the construction of suitable re-
quests from the set of test input generated in previous 
step. For the request to be valid, all the form tags must 
be filled. In fact, each test request contains only one 
unique malicious input; all other inputs are valid with 
respect to the constraints.  
The fact that there is only one single malicious data 
in each test request allows avoiding any side-effects 
due to the server-side rejecting the request. Also, if the 
test fails, revealing the lack of input validation or a 
serious security flaw, the fact that each request con-
tains only one maliciously input facilitates the localiza-
tion of the source of this problem.  
To generate these requests, the malicious and ge-
nuine data are combined to fill the forms. Then, the 
requests are sent to the server side to be processed. 
Afterwards, the server responds and all these responses 
are stored in order to be interpreted and classified. 
7. Experiments and results 
This section presents an evaluation of both the pro-
tection technique using three case studies, which are 
JForum, Insecure and DVWA (Damn Vulnerable Web 
application) and the bypass testing technique using 
four case studies (JForum, Roller, PhpBB and MyRe-
view).  JForum and PhpBB are widely used web appli-
cations that help creating forums. Roller allows creat-
ing customized blogs while MyReview is a conference 
management tool. Finally, Insecure and DVWA are 
vulnerable web applications used to demonstrate web 
attacks and to evaluate the protection techniques.   
This section presents and discusses several results. 
Firstly, we evaluate the number of forms that are au-
tomatically parsed using our tool. We calculate the 
number of forms that are parsed through manual navi-
gation in order to estimate the effort needed to parse all 
the forms.  Secondly, we calculate the number of vul-
nerabilities that are stopped by the bypass-shield. 
Thirdly, we evaluated the testing tool by applying it to 
four popular web applications including JForum. The 
idea is to evaluate the ability of the bypass testing tool 
to discover new vulnerabilities or robustness issues in 
web applications. Finally, we estimate the overhead 
due to the use of the shield by calculating the addition-
al latency (which is almost constant for a given confi-
guration). In fact, duplicating constraints in an ‘in-the-
middle’ shield may create an overhead. The results 
provide evidence of the fact that the shield is a 
lightweight solution. 
7.1. Parsing results  
We applied our parser to automatically get all the 
forms. Table 4 shows the number of forms.  
The results show that the number of forms that are 
automatically discovered is much bigger than those 
parsed using manual navigation (80% for Insecure and 
65% for JForum and 100% for DVWA). The results 
show that the automated parser helps getting most of 
the forms. 
Table 4 - Automated vs. manual parsing 
 Insecure JForum DV
WA 
Automated 
parsing 
12 22 23 
Manual 
navigation 
3 13 0 
Total 15 34 13 
7.2. Bypass shielding results 
This section presents an evaluation of the effective-
ness of the shield in stopping attacks. Using classical 
penetration testing techniques and using the WA3F 
tool (the third co-author is a security expert), we were 
able to find 9 exploitable vulnerabilities in JForum. For 
the other two web applications, the vulnerabilities are 
well known and documented since they are vulnerable 
by construction. Table 5 shows the overall number of 
vulnerabilities for each application and the number of 
vulnerabilities that were mitigated thanks to the by-
pass-shield using automatically retrieved constraints 
and manually added constraints. Most of these vulne-
rabilities are related to weak server-side validation of 
user input, which enable performing attacks like: SQL 
Injection, XSS and DOS: Denial of Service, which try 
to send a huge amount of data to the server to make it 
crash. By duplicating client side constraints, the shield 
allows mitigating these vulnerabilities. By restricting 
the content and length of fields like name or phone 
number, the shield allows blocking attacks (SQL injec-
tion or DOS attacks).  
Table 5 - Vulnerabilities mitigated by the shield 
 Insecure JForum DVWA 
Without shield 15  9  5 
With shield 3 5 3 
The remaining vulnerabilities that are not mitigated 
by the shield are related to XSS which exploit text 
fields. Even with specific constraints the shield was not 
able to stop these XSS attacks.    
7.3. Bypass testing results 
The bypass testing results are shown in Table 6. Using 
the bypass testing tool, we were not able to discover 
any serious issue in both phpBB3 and Roller. Howev-
er, we were able to find some robustness problems, 
especially in the JForum application.  
In fact, the tests provoked 353 failures related to three 
kinds of Java exceptions:  
- Null Pointer Exception: Use of a null variable. It 
occurs when null inputs are sent to server. 
- Class Cast Exception: incompatible class type 
cast. When unexpected input is sent to server (an 
input that is not is a predefined list).  
- Number Format exception: The server tried to 
convert a string into an integer. It occurs when non 
numeric values are sent instead of numbers. 
Table 6 – Bypass testing results 
App. #Failures  #SQL failures  
#Null 
Response 
Responses 
codes  
JForum  Java: 353 1 0 [302, 404] 
phpBB3 0 0 183 - 
Myreview 0 1 650 - 
Roller 0 0 0 [405, 500] 
These failures are due to bugs in the input validation 
code located in the server-side. The server did not 
check correctly the user inputs. In addition, for two 
web applications (phpBB3 and MyReview), we re-
ceived ‘Null responses’. The server returned empty 
responses. Furthermore, according to the response 
code, there were three kinds of responses: 
- Response 404: The requested page is not found. 
This occurred when hidden values were modified. 
The server uses them to reach certain kinds of 
pages. When the hidden value is not correct, this 
leads to the response 404.  
- Response 405: The method is not allowed (using 
GET method when submitting a form instead of 
POST). 
- Response 500: Internal server error. 
We found two SQL flaws in MyReview and in JFo-
rum. The JForum one originated from a form used to 
submit new posts in the forum where the input subject 
length is not checked by the server side. When a long 
string is sent to the server an SQL Exception occurs 
and the SQL query is exposed to users. This vulnera-
bility was discovered manually by our security expert 
when he performed penetration testing on JForum.  
7.4. Performance results 
To measure the overhead due to the bypass shield, 
we generated 50 instances of each form in JForum and 
run it with and without the shield in order to record 
differences in the execution time. We repeated this 
process ten times and calculated the average of execu-
tion times. We calculated a constant overhead value of 
3 ms (with our server configuration).  
8. Conclusion and Future Work 
This paper presented a new approach that aims at 
automating the shielding of web-applications against 
bypass attacks. The novelty of the approach resides in 
the analysis of the HTML code to extract constraints 
on the user inputs in addition to the JavaScript valida-
tion code. These inputs are used to build a shield that 
executes as a reverse proxy to enforce these con-
straints. This tool suite will be extended to cope with 
other security issues. A new study is in progress that 
will use the shield to protect against attacks other that 
bypass attacks. The bypass-shield and its client con-
straints and inputs that are collected constitute an inter-
esting platform to implement new kinds of protection 
strategies.  
Another research direction would be to apply this 
approach to rich internet application (like Ajax or Flex) 
where client-server communication is asynchronous 
which makes the analysis very difficult. Automatically 
analyzing the traffic between the client and the server 
may help coping with this technology. 
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